Decoy-state protocols provide a way to defeat photon-number splitting attacks in quantum cryptography implemented with weak coherent pulses. We point out that previous security analyses of such protocols relied on assumptions about eavesdropping attacks that considered treating each pulse equally and independently. We give an example to demonstrate that, without such assumptions, the security parameters of previous decoy-state implementations could be worse than the ones claimed. Next we consider more general photon-number splitting attacks, which correlate different pulses, and give an estimation procedure for the number of single photon signals with rigorous security statements. The impact of our result is that previous analyses of the number of times a decoy-state quantum cryptographic system can be reused before it makes a weak key must be revised.
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I. INTRODUCTION: PHOTON NUMBER SPLITTING ATTACKS AND DECOY-STATE PROTOCOLS
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] [2] [3] [4] allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a common and secret key S that is informationally secure; see [5] [6] [7] and references therein. A widely used setup for QKD is the one suggested by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [2] . BB84 is ideally implemented by preparing and transmitting singlephoton pulses. Information can be encoded in the state of one of two conjugate polarization bases, e.g. vertical/horizontal or diagonal/antidiagonal. Only those photons that were prepared by Alice and detected by Bob in the same basis are useful to build a sifted key, which forms S after additional steps of information reconciliation and privacy amplification. Security follows from the inability of faithfully copying quantum information [8] and the unavoidable information-disturbance trade-off in quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, realistic implementations of BB84 use weak coherent photon pulses that could involve many photons, avoiding the assumptions made in security analyses [9] [10] [11] . Such pulses could be exploited by Eve, the eavesdropper, to gain access to the (insecure) distributed key using a so-called photon-number splitting (PNS) attack [12, 13] . In a simple proposed PNS attack, Eve measures the number of photons in the pulse, n. If n = 1, Eve blocks the pulse. If n ≥ 2, Eve "splits" the pulse to obtain a copy of a single photon with the correct polarization and keeps it in her quantum memory. Eve could then obtain a full copy of S by making measurements of her photons in the correct polarization bases, which are known after a public discussion between Alice and Bob. Since Alice and Bob cannot measure n, a PNS attack may go undetected. Our goal is to provide a protocol for secure QKD in the presence of PNS attacks.
A simple approach to overcome a PNS attack considers reducing the probability of multi-photon pulses by reducing the coherent-pulse intensities. The drawback with this approach is that the probability of creating singlephoton pulses is also reduced. Then, the rate at which bits to build S are sifted is far from optimal [13, 14] . Another approach is to use decoy states, that allow to detect PNS attacks without a substantial reduction on the rate of sifted bits if Eve is not present [15] [16] [17] . In a decoy-state protocol (DSP), one of several weak coherent sources is randomly selected for each pulse. Such sources create pulses of different intensities (mean photon numbers). This gives Alice and Bob a means to estimate f 0 and f 1 , the number of Bob's detections due to empty and single-photon pulses prepared by Alice, in the same basis, respectively. The values of f 0 and f 1 are important to determine |S|, the length of the secure key. For example, in the discussed PNS attack, f 1 is substantially smaller than its value when Eve is not present, and so is |S|.
In more detail, we let K 1 be the total number of pulses prepared by Alice. We first assume that the channel is non-adversarial, i.e. no eavesdropping attacks are present. If the pulse has a random phase, the number of photons it contains is sampled according to the Poisson distribution:
where µ is the mean photon number for that source and µ ≤ 1 in applications. We let η be the transmission/detection efficiency of the quantum channel shared by Alice and Bob. 
is the probability of a detection by Bob given that Alice's prepared pulse contained n photons. y n is the so-called n-photon yield and y n < 1 due to losses in the channel.
For n ≥ 1, we may assume
which is a good approximation in applications. For n = 0, y 0 > 0 denotes Bob's detector dark-count rate. The total probability of Bob detecting a pulse (in any one cycle) is the total yield
Y (µ) can be estimated by Alice and Bob, via public discussion, from the frequency of detections after all pulses were transmitted. In QKD, we allow Eve to manipulate the parameters that characterize the channel at her will. We use the superscript E to represent the interaction of Eve with the communication. For example, y That is, by being able to estimate Y E (µ) for two values of µ 1 via public discussion, Alice and Bob can restrict Eve's attack so that the dark-count rate and single-photon yield are almost unchanged from the nonadversarial case. In addition, if a third source with µ ≈ 1 is randomly invoked, an optimal key rate of order η will be achieved.
In reality, the estimation of y E 0 and y E 1 is subject to finite statistics and can be technically involved. Nevertheless, the i.i.d. assumption in Eq. (3) allows Alice and Bob to gain information about Eve's attack by running the protocol and analyzing the (binomial) distributions of the detection events for each source. However, we remark that if Eve were to correlate her attacks, the i.i.d. assumption and the corresponding security analyses would be invalid. This is the main motivation behind our analysis.
In this paper, we give an example that shows how the i.i.d. assumption can be simply bypassed by Eve, resulting in security parameters that are worse from those obtained under the assumption. We then analyze the security of DSPs for general PNS attacks. Our main result is an estimation procedure that gives a lower bound on f E 0 and f E 1 , with a confidence level that is an input to the estimation procedure. Our security analysis does not use the i.i.d. assumption and is particularly relevant when Eve performs a PNS attack that could correlate different pulses in one session or even different sessions. We compare some results obtained by our estimation procedure with those obtained by using the i.i.d. assumption, and emphasize the important of our procedure.
II. THE SECURITY PARAMETER, THE I.I.D. ASSUMPTION, AND FINITE STATISTICS
Of high significance in cryptographic protocols is , the so-called security parameter. measures the deviation of a real protocol implementation from an ideal one. We use the same definition used in Ref. [7] , that states that a real QKD protocol is -secure if it is -indistinguishable from a perfectly secure and ideal one. This definition is equivalent to a statement on the trace norm of the difference between the quantum states resulting from the real and ideal protocol, respectively. It implies that a QKD protocol that is -secure can be safely reused order 1/ times without compromising its security.
Usually, one fixes a value for and then determines the size of S based on several protocol performance parameters. These parameters include the number of pulses sent by Alice, the number of pulses detected by Bob, and the estimated bit error rates at each mean photon number. For DSPs, has a component DSP that determines the confidence level in the estimation of a lower bound of f
and f E 1 , due to finite statistics. A possible way to obtain such lower bounds, under the i.i.d. assumption, is the one followed in Ref [17] . In this case, we consider a DSP with three sources, i = U, V, W . The mean photon number in each pulse, for each source, is µ U = 0, µ V 1, and µ W ∈ O(1). Each source i randomly prepares a pulse with probability q i and we let K i be the total number of pulses for that source. K i is known to Alice and Bob by public discussion after all pulses are sent and
We write D i,E for the random variable that counts the number of pulses from source i detected by Bob under the presence of Eve [18] . The exact value that D i,E takes in a session can also be obtained by Alice and Bob via public discussion after the pulses were transmitted.
, where E[.] denotes the mean value. That is, for a given DSP , we can establish confidence intervals
with confidence level 1 −¯ DSP . The constant c depends on¯ DSP and can be obtained using Chernoff's bound [19] -see Appendix B. The standard deviation in this case is
Using Eq. (3) for Y E (µ i ), we can search for the minimum values of y We remark that Eq. (5) 
III. INCREASING THE LENGTH OF CONFIDENCE INTERVALS: AN ATTACK
The analysis in Sec. II used the i.i.d. assumption that resulted in a value for σ i,E given by Eq. (6). Nevertheless, the actual value of σ i,E could be much higher in more general PNS attacks. For the same confidence level, a bigger σ i,E implies a "wider" confidence interval for the estimation of the yield Y E (µ i ) (Appendix B), and thus smaller lower bounds on f E 0 and f E 1 . The overall result in the DSP is a secret key S of smaller size for the same security parameter.
To illustrate how Eve can bypass the i.i.d. assumption, we suggest a potential attack that results in almost no change for the total yields (i.e., [20] but the variances σ i,E are increased with respect to those of the binomial distribution [Eq. (6)]. The suggested attack could be detected by Alice and Bob by estimating the variances directly via public discussion. Nevertheless, it still shows that a better analysis of the security of DSPs is needed to make rigorous claims.
In the attack, Eve first picks an integer value for τ ≥ 1, where τ 2 denotes a scale for a variance or "correlation" of a particular distribution. Eve receives all pulses from Alice and we let k n be the total number of n-photon pulses in the protocol. Note that the exact value of k n is known to Eve but not to Alice and Bob. In general, k n is sampled according to the binomial distribution
where p n is the probability of a pulse containing n photons:
n . The mean and variance for such distribution are
n is the total number of detections due to n-photon pulses prepared by Alice. In particular, we assume that Eve can control d E 0 , which determines the dark-count rate. The distribution associated with d E n has the following properties:
We let d
i,E n be the number of n-photon pulses, prepared by Alice's ith source only, and detected by Bob. The exact value of d
where
The distribution associated with d
As in Sec. II, we let (σ i,E ) 2 be the variance associated with the random variable
and
can be obtained if we approximate K i ≈ q i K, in the limit of large K. In addition, because K is fixed, the variables k n are not independent. However, in the large-K limit, k n can also be approximated by its mean value. It implies that the k n are almost independent and so are the d 
In Appendix A we show that
By inserting Eq. (12) in Eq. (11), we can obtain the variances as a function of τ . In Fig. 1 we compute σ U,E and σ V,E . The i.i.d. assumption discussed in Sec. II corresponds to τ = 1 -see Appendix A. Using these results in Eq. (5) yields wider confidence intervals for the same confidence level.
To illustrate our point further, we consider a simple attack in which a single source U is used to estimate the dark-count rate. Here, µ U = 0 and d
E 0 is sampled according to the binomial distribution with probability y 0 and known sample size k 0 = K U . Nevertheless, for the correlated attack, we assume that Eve "receives" the K U pulses and groups them according to blocks of size τ 2 . Then, Eve will force (prevent) the detection of all pulses in any one block with probability y 0 (1 − y 0 ). The random variable d E 0 for the correlated attack satisfies and τ = 1 corresponds again to the i.i.d. assumption [see Eq. (7)].
In Fig. 2 (A) , we plot the probability that
for different values of c and τ . For τ = 1, such a probability corresponds to the confidence level in Eq. (5). E[Z U,E ] = y 0 in this example. For the inverse problem, namely the estimation of y 0 from D U,E and K U , Eq. (5) may be incorrect. We may then assume a uniform prior distribution for y 0 ∈ [0, 1], and obtain the posterior distribution as
which is plotted in Fig. 2 (B) . Our results demonstrate that, for a fixed security parameter, the accuracy in the estimation of the dark-count rate strongly depends on Eve's attack and can be substantially different from the one obtained under the i.i.d. assumption (τ = 1).
IV. SECURITY OF DSP: CORRELATED PNS ATTACKS
We go beyond the i.i.d. assumption and study more general and correlated PNS attacks, in which Eve has full control on Bob's detection events. The secure key-rate in a realistic implementation of QKD is [17] s ≥ f
which determines the size of the distributed key as |S| = sK. F E is the total number of pulses detected by Bob and prepared by Alice in the same basis, that are useful for the sifted key. In BB84,
where D E is the total number of detections. f E * n is a lower bound on f E n , the number of n-photon pulses prepared and detected in the same basis. H 2 (.) is the Shannon entropy, κ EC and κ PA are coefficients due to the error correction and privacy amplification steps, BER is the total bit error rate, and b max 1 is an upper bound to the bit error rate due to single-photon pulses only.
In a DSP, we characterize a general PNS attack by the distribution
See Fig. 3 for an example. Our goal is to build an estimation procedure that places confidence intervals on f
from the known D i,E . These intervals ultimately imply a lower bound on ssee Eq. (14) .
We assume that there are three sources satisfying µ U = 0 < µ V < µ W , and µ W ∈ O(1). Nevertheless, our analysis can be easily generalized to the case in which more sources are present, where the estimation is more accurate. Our estimation procedure uses d
i,E n to determine the confidence intervals The corresponding confidence level for each inequality is 1 − n /2. The upper and lower bounds are monotonic and invertible functions. Then,
with the same confidence levels. Such confidence levels do not result from the binomial distribution as we are analyzing the inverse problem, namely the estimation of d E n from the available information (i.e., D i,E and K i ). From Eqs. (10) and (17), we obtain 
when three sources are used. Since f E * 0 and f E * 1 are sampled according to a binomial distribution when given F E (i.e., the preparation and detection basis are random), we obtain
where the constant c(δ DSP ) ≥ 0 can be obtained using Eq. (B3). The overall confidence level for the key rate s
FIG. 4. Upper and lower bounds on
The yellow blocks represent the number of pulses from source V with n = 0 and n = 1. The dark and blue blocks represent the total number of pulses with n = 0 and n = 1, respectively. The confidence level for this case is not smaller than 1
is 1 − DSP , where the security parameter satisfies
In the next section we obtain the confidence intervals and levels specifically for our method. n only, the probability that d
with
n is sampled according to Eq. (8) . From Chernoff's bound (Appendix B)
and we choose the lower bound so that
with c n ≥ 0. The error probability satisfies
See Appendix C. A similar analysis gives the upper bound
with the same confidence level. Then, to satisfy Eq. (23), it suffices to set c 2 n ( DSP ) = 4| log( DSP /24) + n log(1/2)| .
To complete the estimation procedure, we invert Eqs. (26) and (28) and obtain
We can then execute a program that finds the minimum values of d . For instance, a quadratic program can be used to search q i n d E * n . Such minimum values will be used in Eqs. (20) and (14) to obtain the key rate.
A technical remark is in order. When n → ∞, q i n (1 − q i n ) → 0 exponentially fast in n. Then, the contribution of large-n terms in Eqs. (29) is negligible. We can set a suitable cutoff n max ≥ n in the number of photons per pulse in our analysis, to avoid unnecessary computational overheads in finding d 
V. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed general photon-number splitting attacks and pointed out that previous security analyses on decoystate protocols for QKD made a strong assumption on the attack. We provided an estimation procedure that sets a lower bound on the size of the secure, distributed key, with the corresponding confidence levels. Our procedure requires executing a program to find the minimum values of the number of detections due to empty and singlephoton pulses, subject to constraints that are determined by the results of the protocol and by the desired security parameter. It results in rigorous security guarantees even if Eve correlates her attack according to the number of photons in the pulse.
We emphasize that our estimation procedure is not unique: Any time that a confidence interval can be set as a function of publicly available information for general attacks, then an estimation procedure is possible. In addition, our choice of confidence intervals and n is not essential and could be further optimized to improve the size of the secure key.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Jane Nordholt, Kevin McCabe, Raymond Newell, Charles Peterson, and Stephanie Wehner for discussions. We thank the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory for support.
Appendix A: Properties of Z
E i
We let X ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} be a random variable and f (X) the probability distribution. The random variable Y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} has the conditional distribution g(Y |X). The probability of Y is h(Y ) = K X=0 g(Y |X)f (X). Then, it is easy to show
is the variance of Y . Also,
is the expected value of Y when given X,
is the variance of Y when given X, and
is the expected value of such a variance. In the attack discussed in Sec. III, K is fixed and the distribution of k n satisfies
It follows that
The first term on the rhs vanishes when τ = 1. The second term is
for τ = 1. Moreover, since n≥0 [y n p
which shows that the case discussed in Sec. II, i.e. the i.i.d. assumption, corresponds to choosing τ = 1 in this case.
Appendix B: Chernoff bound
Chernoff's bound [19] sets a bound on the probabilities of "rare" events as a function of the standard deviation of the corresponding distribution. More precisely, we let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be a set of i.i.d. random variables that satisfy |X j | ≤ 1 and define X = j X j . A general version of Chernoff's bound implies
where σ = n 1/2 E[(X j ) 2 ] − (E[X j ]) 2 is the standard deviation. For the special case of the binomial distribution where X j = 1 with probability a and X j = 0 otherwise, 
If we set, 
